Anti-anti-suit injunctions before the UPC: Europe strikes back

Litigation over standard essential patents is no longer fought solely on the ground of infringement. It is fought on the ground of jurisdiction. The anti-suit injunction (ASI), by which a court forbids a party from pursuing proceedings abroad, has become a standard weapon in global FRAND disputes: it allows infringement actions brought in Europe to be neutralized from the United States or China.

Europe has forged the countermeasure: the anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI), which prohibits a party from seeking or pursuing an ASI. Since December 2024, the Unified Patent Court (UPC) has joined this movement, and it has done so with remarkable clarity: ex parte orders, turnaround within days, deterrent penalties.

The conceptual tension is real: on one side, international comity, which counsels against interference with foreign courts; on the other, the protection of property rights, of which access to the courts is now treated as a component. The UPC has come down firmly on the second side, and that line now shapes every litigation strategy involving standard essential patents.

From anti-suit to anti-anti-suit

The logic of the AASI was first laid down by national courts. In France, the Paris Court of Appeal, in IPCom v Lenovo (3 March 2020, RG 19/21426), ordered the defendants to withdraw their ASI motion pending before a Californian court. The reasoning is one of principle: an ASI that prevents a patentee from enforcing its patents infringes the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by the European Convention on Human Rights.

German courts have followed a parallel path on the basis of Sections 823(1) and 1004(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB): the ASI is characterized as an unlawful interference with the patentee's property, which the court may preventively enjoin. It is this French and German foundation that the UPC has made its own.

Huawei v Netgear: the UPC enters the fray

On 6 December 2024, Netgear asked a federal court in California for an ASI designed to paralyze Huawei's actions in Europe, including before the UPC. The reply was immediate: on 11 December 2024, the Munich local division issued, ex parte, the UPC's first AASI (UPC_CFI_791/2024), prohibiting Netgear from pursuing its US motion, with the Munich I Regional Court issuing a comparable order on the same day.

The grounds deserve attention. The local division relied on Article 32(1)(c) UPCA (jurisdiction over provisional and protective measures), on the Brussels I bis Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 and on Articles 17(2) and 47 of the Charter. Above all, it held that preventing the patentee from enforcing its rights amounts to an interference with the patent itself: judicial protection becomes an attribute of the substantive right.

What followed shows what was at stake. On 24 December 2024, the Chinese Supreme People's Court issued its very first AASI, precisely in the Huawei v Netgear dispute. And after the Munich local division's decision on the merits of 18 December 2024, coupled with an injunction, Netgear settled as early as January 2025 by taking a license from Sisvel's Wi-Fi 6 patent pool . The AASI is no academic exercise: it precipitates settlements.

2025-2026: an established practice

The Mannheim local division took over. On 27 May 2025, in InterDigital v Disney, it granted an AASI where Disney refused to undertake not to seek an ASI in the United States: a serious threat suffices, with the security required from the applicant (EUR 400,000 according to published commentary) framing the measure.

On 30 September 2025, in InterDigital v Amazon, the same division went one step further with an ex parte order of a novel kind, the "anti-interim-license" injunction: Amazon was prohibited from seeking an interim license before the English courts, which the division found would operate as a de facto bar to UPC proceedings. The London High Court replied with its own AASI: the escalation between courts is now head-on.

The trend was confirmed in 2026. On 20 April 2026, the Mannheim local division issued in Nokia v Geely (UPC_CFI_1291/2026) an ex parte AASI prohibiting the carmaker from pursuing the global interim license it had requested on 8 April 2026 before the Hangzhou court in China, on pain of substantial penalties. Comparable orders have been reported in Nokia's favour in other disputes involving Chinese defendants. The AASI has moved from exception to routine tool for managing parallel litigation.

The global context: China, the United States, the United Kingdom

China had opened hostilities with ASIs of unprecedented breadth: in Huawei v Conversant (Supreme People's Court, 28 August 2020), then in Xiaomi v InterDigital before the Wuhan Intermediate Court, Chinese courts prohibited patentees from enforcing foreign injunctions or having FRAND rates set elsewhere. The Delhi High Court had struck back as early as 9 October 2020 with an AASI in InterDigital v Xiaomi.

That Chinese apparatus is now under strain: on 21 July 2025, a report issued in WTO proceedings concluded that China's ASI policy on standard essential patents was inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. China has not disarmed for all that, as Geely's resort to interim licenses before the Hangzhou judge shows.

In the United States, the ASI remains an extraordinary but available remedy, since Microsoft v Motorola (9th Cir., 2012), subject to identity of the parties and to the dispositive character of the US action. In the United Kingdom, the battleground has shifted to interim licenses: granted at first instance in the Samsung/ZTE dispute in June 2025, the declaration was reversed on appeal in late 2025. It is precisely against this English technique that the UPC has directed its most recent orders.

What this means for FRAND strategies

For the holder of a standard essential patent, the lesson is clear: the UPC offers fast judicial protection, obtained ex parte within days, which secures both actions on the merits and applications for apreliminary injunction. Anticipating the ASI threat, documenting its indicia (statements, the defendant's track record, parallel proceedings) and preparing the application in advance are now part of the ordinary conduct of a dispute over FRAND license.

For the implementer, seeking an ASI or an interim license abroad exposes it to heavy penalties in Europe and weakens its position as a good-faith negotiator within the meaning of Huawei v ZTE. A serious defence is built on the FRAND ground itself, as shown by the UPC's first FRAND decision in Panasonic v Oppo, and on the ground of evidence, notably the production of comparable licenses.

The underlying question remains: will this European firmness deter foreign ASIs, or will it feed ever more inventive strategies? The UPC's first years, of which we have offered a critical overall reading, suggest that the procedural arms race is only beginning. The orders are published in the UPC register of decisions.

Key takeaways

• The AASI prohibits a party from seeking or pursuing a foreign anti-suit injunction; the UPC grants it ex parte, on the basis of Article 32(1)(c) UPCA and Articles 17 and 47 of the Charter.
• The UPC's first AASI: Huawei v Netgear, Munich local division, 11 December 2024 (UPC_CFI_791/2024), in response to a Californian ASI motion.
• The practice has consolidated in Mannheim: InterDigital v Disney (27 May 2025), InterDigital v Amazon (30 September 2025, "anti-interim-license" order), Nokia v Geely (20 April 2026, UPC_CFI_1291/2026).
• The conflict has shifted to interim licenses, English and then Chinese, which the UPC now counters with its defensive orders.
• On 21 July 2025, a WTO report found China's ASI policy inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
• For patentees and implementers alike, managing ASI risk has become a full component of FRAND strategy before the UPC.

Frequently asked questions

What is an anti-anti-suit injunction before the UPC?

It is a provisional measure, generally obtained ex parte, by which the UPC prohibits a party from seeking or pursuing abroad an anti-suit injunction that would prevent it from enforcing its patents in Europe, on pain of penalties.

On what basis does the UPC assert jurisdiction to grant an AASI?

The UPC relies on Article 32(1)(c) UPCA on provisional measures, on the Brussels I bis Regulation and on Articles 17(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: obstructing access to the court amounts to interfering with the patent itself.

Can a foreign interim license block an action before the UPC?

That is precisely the risk the UPC intends to neutralize: in InterDigital v Amazon and then Nokia v Geely, the local divisions prohibited defendants from seeking such licenses in the United Kingdom or in China, viewing them as a de facto bar equivalent to an anti-suit injunction.

When should an AASI application be prepared?

As soon as a serious ASI threat exists: statements by the defendant, refusal to undertake not to seek one, parallel proceedings in the United States or China. The application is prepared ahead of the action on the merits, with an evidentiary file establishing the threat.

The firm assists patentees and implementers in standard essential patent litigation before the UPC and the French courts, including in obtaining, or defending against, AASI-type protective measures. Talk to us.

This article is an original and substantially updated adaptation of an analysis by Matthieu Dhenne first published on Kluwer Patent Blog on April 4, 2025: The UPC Takes the Offensive: Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions on the Rise.