Samsung, UMTS standard essential patents (European Commission, AT.39939, 2014)

Dhenne Avocats · 11 October 2026

Our analysis

Summary

By a decision adopted under Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission makes binding for five years Samsung’s commitments not to seek injunctions in the EEA, on the basis of its patents essential to mobile standards, against any potential licensee that signs up to and complies with a licensing framework (recitals 76 and 122, Article 1). The framework combines a negotiation period of up to twelve months with, failing agreement, a third-party determination of FRAND terms (recital 78).

The decision does not conclude whether there has been an infringement (recital 126). It nonetheless sets out the Commission’s preliminary view on injunctions based on standard essential patents and a model determination procedure which names, among others, the Unified Patent Court (recital 98).

Facts and procedure

In December 1998 Samsung gave ETSI an undertaking to license its UMTS patents on FRAND terms (recital 60). From 21 April 2011 it sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against Apple in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom based on UMTS standard essential patents, and withdrew them in December 2012 (recital 54).

The Commission issued a Statement of Objections on 21 December 2012 (recital 3). Samsung offered commitments on 27 September 2013, which were market tested by a notice published in OJ C 302 of 18 October 2013 and drew 18 observations, and final commitments on 3 February 2014 (recitals 17 to 20).

The applicable law

The proceedings were brought under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. In its preliminary assessment, the Commission identifies a market for the licensing of UMTS technologies, at least EEA wide, on which Samsung holds a 100% share (recitals 41 to 51).

The exercise of an exclusive right may, in exceptional circumstances and absent objective justification, amount to abuse (recital 56). Those circumstances lie in the UMTS standardisation process and the FRAND undertaking, by which Samsung agreed to be remunerated through royalties rather than to exclude others (recitals 56 to 61). The injunctions could exclude Apple and induce it to accept less favourable terms (recital 62). The justifications put forward are rejected, since Apple was not unwilling to take a FRAND licence (recitals 65 to 70).

Question

Which commitments suffice to meet the competition concerns raised by injunction claims based on FRAND encumbered standard essential patents and brought against a licensee that is not unwilling?

Decision

The Commission makes the final commitments binding for five years (Article 1) and finds that there are no longer grounds for action (Article 2). Samsung will not seek injunctions in the EEA against a licensee that accepts and complies with the framework; the period for accepting the invitation to negotiate was extended from 30 to 60 days in the final version (recitals 76 and 100). Failing agreement, FRAND terms are set by the Patents Court (High Court of England and Wales) or by the Unified Patent Court; arbitration applies only by agreement or if the court declines jurisdiction (recital 98).

Validity, essentiality and infringement may be raised in the determination proceedings (recital 99). Samsung may not make a licence conditional on a cross licence of non essential patents (recital 102). A licensee that does not sign up to the framework is not presumed unwilling: the court seised of an injunction claim assesses all the circumstances (recital 123). Samsung may still act against a licensee that has itself sought an injunction on mobile standard essential patents (recital 79).

Key points for practice

• A commitments decision does not decide whether there was an infringement (recital 126); its preliminary assessment nonetheless informs the application of Article 102 TFEU to injunctions based on standard essential patents.
• Declining the framework does not make a licensee presumptively unwilling (recital 123): the court hearing the injunction claim still assesses its conduct case by case.
• The scope is confined to mobile standard essential patents and to injunctions sought in the EEA; injunctions outside the EEA are not covered (recitals 76, 114 and 115).
• Practical point: for the Commission, a time limited negotiation followed by judicial or arbitral determination of FRAND terms is a route that meets the concerns raised by injunctions, and it is a useful benchmark when framing an offer or counter offer.

Relevance before the UPC

The commitments name the Unified Patent Court as one of the two default determination fora, and the arbitration centre provided for in Article 35(1) of the UPC Agreement as one of the arbitral options (recital 98).

Provisions applied

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Art. 102

Other provisions

EEA Agreement, Art. 54; Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, Arts 9 and 27(4); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 16, 17(2), 47 and 52(1); ETSI IPR Policy, clause 6.1

Case law cited

Volvo (238/87); Magill (C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P); Bronner (C-7/97); IMS Health (C-418/01); Microsoft v Commission (T-201/04); AstraZeneca v Commission (T-321/05 and C-457/10 P); Deutsche Telekom v Commission (C-280/08 P); TeliaSonera (C-52/09); Post Danmark (C-209/10); Commission v Alrosa (C-441/07 P)

Prepared by Dhenne Avocats from the text of the decision (European Commission website, ec.europa.eu/competition), consulted on 11 October 2026. Only the official text is authoritative.